Date when decision was rendered: 23.9.1992

Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 1698; S92/31

Reference to source

VaaHO 1993:6.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

public hearing,
offentligt förhör,
julkinen menettely,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 17, sections 24-1 and 12-2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 3-1 of the Land Extraction Act; section 26 of the Public Health Act

= rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel, 24 § 1 mom. och 12 § 2 mom.; marktäktslagen 3 § 1 mom.; hälsovårdslagen 26 §

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 24 § 1 mom. ja 12 § 2 mom. maa-aineslaki 3 § 1 mom.; terveydenhoitolaki 26 §.

CCPR (unspecified), ECHR (unspecified)

Abstract

The court of first instance had decided on the secrecy of a witness statement and of a copy of a deed of sale.The Vaasa Court of Appeal overruled this decision with the reasoning that the publicity of trials is one of the leading principles in procedural law.It enables, for its part, control of the courts by citizens.This is emphasized in the ECHR and the CCPR.Therefore, domestic provisions concerning the possibility of conducting oral hearings without the public having access to the hearings and concerning the secrecy of written court documentation must be interpreted narrowly.In the case at hand, no special reasons had been presented for the deviation from the main rule, the publicity of trials.The Supreme Court did not grant leave of appeal.

23.3.1998 / 2.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 15.6.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 1933; S97/1206

Reference to source

KKO 1998:66.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1998 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1998 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1998 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1998

Pages: pp. 373-377

Subject

fair trial, public hearing, best interests of the child, children, child welfare,
rättvis rättegång, offentligt förhör, barnets bästa, barn, barnomsorg,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, julkinen menettely, lapsen etu, lapset, lastenhuolto,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 9, 10-1 and 14 of the Child Custody and Right of Access Act

= lag angående vårdnad om barn och umgängesrätt 9 §, 10 § 1 mom. och 14 §

= laki lapsen huollosta ja tapaamisoikeudesta 9 §, 10 § 1 mom. ja 14 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A had been convicted to six years of imprisonment for killing his wife B.On the night of the incident, B's mother D had taken care of A's and B's common child C (4 years old during the proceedings).Later, the social welfare board decided to take C into care and to place her in a foster home and, by a later decision, in a children's home.

D, her daughter E and E's husband F had submitted a motion to the Turku of first instance according to which D should be granted custody of C and E and F should be appointed C's secondary guardians.The court of first instance referred to section 14-1 of the Child Custody and Right of Access Act, according to which a case concerning custody of a child is instituted by an application made by the parents together, by one of the parents, by the child's guardian or by the social welfare board.If the child has been left without a guardian, such an application may also be made by a relative or another person with a close relationship with the child (section 14-2).According to the court of first instance, although the right to take legal action was thus restricted, there was no contradiction between this provision and Article 6 of the ECHR.Although A had been sentenced to imprisonment, he nevertheless was C's legal guardian under the Child Custody and Right of Access Act.Therefore D, E or F, according to the court, did not have the right to demand custody of C.Their application was dismissed.

D, E and F appealed to the court of appeal.The court of appeal referred to section 9 of the above-mentioned Child Custody Act according to which a child's custody may for extremely weighty reasons be granted to someone else than the child's parents.The crime A had committed showed that he was permanently incapable of taking care of a child.The court concluded that the best interests of the child would not be taken into account sufficiently, if the application of D, E and F was not heard before a court.A dissenting member of the court held with the decision of the court of first instance.

A and the social welfare board appealed to the Supreme Court.In its decision the Supreme Court noted, that under the Child Custody and Right of Access Act, A is C's legal guardian and the relatives had no right to take legal action in the case under section 14-1 of the Act.There was also no need to give section 14-1 a wide interpretation, as prohibiting A, once having served his sentence, from acting as C's guardian.The social welfare board has a legal obligation, if necessary, to take action, in order to secure that the care of a child is arranged according to the best interests of the child.

The Supreme Court noted that when interpreting the provisions on the right to take legal action, regard should be taken of the provisions of the Constitution Act and the ECHR.Also in the light of these provisions it is acceptable that relatives have the right to take legal action in custody cases only if the child has been left without a guardian.Restricting the right to take legal action is in the best interests of a child, in preventing the child from being involved in any possible discrepancies between the people that are close to the child.

The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the court of appeal and upheld the decision of the court of first instance.

23.10.2002 / 31.5.2006 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 3.12.1999

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3378; R 99/269

Reference to source

KKO 1999:123.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1999 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1999 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1999 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 2000

Pages: pp. 710-714

Subject

fair trial, public hearing, legal protection,
rättvis rättegång, offentligt förhör, rättsskydd,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, julkinen menettely, oikeusturva,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 31, sections 1 and 16 of the Code of Judicial Procedure; section 11 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings; section 16-1 of the Constitution Act

= rättegångsbalken 31 kapitel 1 § och 16 §; lag om offentlighet vid rättegång 11 §; regeringsformen 16 § 1 mom.

= oikeudenkäymiskaari 31 luku 1 § ja 16 §; laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta 11 §; hallitusmuoto 16 § 1 mom.

ECHR-6; CCPR-14-1

Abstract

In a murder case against A, the court of first instance made a separate decision to hear the case in a closed session and to declare the documents in the case confidential, except for the application for a summons as far as it concerned the description of the criminal act (excluding the identity of the victim) and the requested penalty for the act.The application for a summons was read in a public session.A had himself asked for a closed hearing, but noted that he should have the right to defend himself in public now that only the prosecutor's views of the case had been made public.A appealed against the decision.

According to section 11 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings, a decision which is made by a court or its chairman on the basis of the Act is not subject to appeal.However, an appeal against such a decision is possible as a part of an appeal against the decision in the case itself.The question was whether A's appeal could be considered as an extraordinary appeal.

According to the Code of Judicial Procedure, an extraordinary appeal on the basis of a procedural fault may be made against a judgment which has become legally binding or a legal decision which is comparable to such a judgment.The Helsinki Court of Appeal concluded that a decision regarding the publicity of the court proceedings was not comparable to a legally binding judgment and an extraordinary appeal against such a decision was not possible.The presenting official of the court and one court member dissented.They referred, among other provisions, to section 16-1 of the Constitution Act, Article 6-1 of the ECHR and Article 14-1 of the CCPR concerning the right to a fair trial and suggested that the provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure should be interpreted to the benefit of the accused.A's right to a fair trial had been endangered, as the court's decision made the application for a summons partly public, but did not give A the possibility to defend himself in public.

In its decision, the Supreme Court assessed whether the lack of an immediate possibility to appeal jeopardized A's right to the protection of the law and whether the matter was such that it could no longer be remedied when a possible appeal was made against the judgment in the case.It also noted that Article 6-1 of the ECHR presupposes a factual possibility of appeal at least in cases in which the fundamental requirements of a fair trial are infringed.A had the possibility to appeal against the decision in connection with an appeal against the judgment in the case.The Supreme Court concluded that the decision regarding the publicity of the proceedings was not final and in this case not comparable to a legally binding judgment.The appeal was dismissed.

25.10.2002 / 10.3.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 9.4.2002

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 923; R2000/291

Reference to source

KKO 2002:28.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2002 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2002 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2002 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2002

Pages: pp. 131-134

Subject

fair trial, public hearing, equality,
rättvis rättegång, offentligt förhör, jämlikhet,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, julkinen menettely, tasa-arvo,

Relevant legal provisions

section 9 2 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings; section 24 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities; section 21 of the Constitution Act

= lag om offentlighet vid rättegång 9 § 2 mom.; lag om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet 24 §; grundlagen 21 §

= laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta 9 § 2 mom.; laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta 24 §; perustuslaki 21 §.

ECHR-6-1; CCPR-14-1

Abstract

In a murder case before a court of first instance, two of the three defendants were minors.The case contained sensitive information on the private life of the persons concerned.For these reasons, the court heard the case in camera, except for the prosecutor's presentation of the charges as far as the summary penal order and the description of the acts charged were concerned.These were heard in an open hearing, but the identity of the victim was not disclosed.The court also ordered that the trial materials were to be kept secret for a period of 40 years, with the exceptions mentioned above.One of the defendants, A, appealed against this decision and asked that his/her response to the prosecutor's charges should be made public.The appeal court did not change the decision of the first instance court.

A appealed further to the Supreme Court and claimed, among other things, that he/she as a defendant had not been treated equally with the prosecutor and had not been given the possibility to defend himself/herself in public.The Supreme Court referred to the grounds for declaring trial documents secret as provided for in the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings and the Act on the Openness of Government Activities.It noted that in interpreting these secrecy provisions, a court must take into account the provisions concerning fair trial included in the Constitution Act, the ECHR and the CCPR.In restricting the publicity of court proceedings, the parties to a case must be treated on an equal basis, unless otherwise required by the interests protected by the secrecy provisions.The court noted that A's response to the charges did not contain any information about the other minor defendant nor any new and sensitive information about the victim which had not already been included in the prosecutor's presentation of the charges.As the presentation of the charges had been public, there were no grounds, according to the Supreme Court, not to make A's response public as well.The Supreme Court changed the decisions of the lower courts so that A's response was declared public, except for information concerning the identity of the victim and the annexes to the response.

9.5.2003 / 16.9.2003 / JKOSKIMI

Date when decision was rendered: 15.6.2010

Judicial body: Helsinki Court of Appeal = Helsingfors hovrätt = Helsingin hovioikeus

Reference: Report no. 1660; R09/2001

Reference to source

HelHO 2010:5.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX-tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

fair trial, oral hearing, public hearing,
rättvis rättegång, muntligt förfarande, offentligt förhör,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, suullinen menettely, julkinen menettely,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 5a, sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act; section 21 of the Constitution Act

= lag om rättegång i brottmål 5a kapitel 1 §, 2 § och 3 §; grundlagen 21 §

= laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa 5a luku 1 §, 2 § ja 3 §; perustuslaki 21 §.

ECHR-6; CCPR-14

Abstract

X was charged with aggravated drunken driving and operating a vehicle without a licence.In the application for a summons the prosecutor proposed that X is sentenced to conditional imprisonment and a fine.When X was summonsed, he confessed to the crimes explained in the charges and informed the court that he consented to deciding the matter on the basis of a written procedure, in accordance with chapter 5a of the Criminal Procedure Act.The court of first instance decided the case in a written procedure without a main hearing and sentenced X to unconditional imprisonment for 3 months and 15 days.The court held that a conditional sentence was not possible because of X's three previous convictions for aggravated drunken driving.X appealed against the decision, requesting a more lenient and conditional penalty or, alternatively, community service.

The court of appeal held that a court is not bound by the prosecutor's suggestion in determining the penalty to be imposed on the defendant.The court decides on the penalty independently also in a written procedure and can impose a more severe penalty than the one proposed by the prosecutor.However, from the defendant's point of view it is of relevance whether a prison sentence is conditional or unconditional.In this case, the unconditional prison sentence came as a surprise to X, because the prosecutor had suggested a conditional sentence.The court referred to the Constitution Act and international human rights provisions according to which a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a public, oral hearing at least before one court instance.An exception has been made to this rule in chapter 5a of the Criminal Procedure Act which allows a court to decide certain, more simple criminal cases on the basis of a written procedure without a main hearing on the consent of the defendant.However, the court of appeal found that, considering the protection of the legal rights of the defendant, it was not sufficient in this case that X had given his consent to a written procedure.The court concluded that the case should not have been decided in a written procedure without reserving X an opportunity to give an oral statement concerning the penalty.The court of appeal revoked the decision of the court of first instance and referred the case back to the lower court for a new consideration.

27.1.2011 / 27.1.2011 / RHANSKI